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One of the most heavily-regulated aspects of the healthcare industry is the 
organ donation system (“Legislation and Policy”).  Regulations in this area are 
intended to ensure the quality of the organs as well as the morality of the process 
through which they were procured. This system, however, is failing; the number 
of patients requiring organ transplants is increasing, but the number of donors 
remains stagnant (Gordon, Patel, Sohn, Hippen, & Sherman, 2014).  Due to the 
lack of available transplant organs, critics and supporters debate whether the 
United States government should allow for the purchasing of transplantable 
organs. The United States government officially outlawed the purchasing of 
organs in the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (“Code of Federal 
Regulation”), making such purchases punishable by fines of up to $50,000 and/or 
5 years in prison (Friedman & Friedman, 2006).  Skeptics of organ-buying point 
to the black market organ industry in India, which feeds on the desperation of the 
poor, to support their views, while those who support the purchasing of organs 
point to the thousands of patients who die waiting for kidney transplants annually 
in the United States. Supporters can also point to how Iran eliminated their 
waiting list for kidney transplants due to their organ-buying policies (Ghods & 
Savaj, 2006). 
Before this debate can be analyzed, though, it is important to realize that 
these arguments are not absolute.  The argument for an altruistic organ 
procurement system relies on the willingness of donors, but that does not mean 
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that non-financial incentives cannot be presented to increase this willingness. The 
current system is not functioning well, so many who do not support the idea of 
purchasing organs still believe that something in the current system must change 
in order to increase donations. Similarly, those who support a market system for 
organs do not necessarily support simply selling organs to the highest bidder.  
Instead, they support a set price for organs, and a combined private and public 
organization to oversee these matters, much like a blood bank (Brams, 1977). 
Some even believe that organs should only be allowed to be purchased after death 
(Brams, 1977).  These views demonstrate that the moderate opinions on both 
sides of the organ-purchasing debate do not support the systematic exploitation of 
the poor for organs, or the death of thousands of Americans per year in keeping 
with the old system. 
One of the main arguments for those who are against the purchasing of 
organs is that morally and culturally, Americans would not accept this practice. 
One of such critics’ major concerns is that impoverished communities will be 
exploited for organs because of their vulnerable financial situation. Some argue 
that it is always the choice of the donor to donate, but others claim that undue 
inducement, in a way forces them into the situation. An undue inducement is an 
“offer that is too good to refuse . . . [and] makes people do something they would 
not otherwise do,” because although such actions may not be directly unethical, 
they can “distort people’s judgment, encouraging them to engage in activities that 
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contravene their interests” (Gordon, Patel, Sohn, Hippen, & Sherman, 2014, para. 
3).   
Those in favor of an altruistic system believe that not only is the practice 
of buying organs wrong, but it would also be ineffective. In a recent study, 
Gordon, Patel, Sohn, Hippen, and Sherman (2014) found that kidney donations 
are the most in-demand transplant procedure in the United States, and they 
determined the minimum amount that people would need to be paid to consider 
donation, what price point indicated undue inducement, and people’s general 
opinion on the purchasing of kidneys.  The study found that the average minimum 
amount a person would have to receive to donate to a family member/friend was 
$5000, and to donate to a stranger was $10,000; they study also found that undue 
inducement was perceived to begin on average at $50,000 for a family 
member/friend and $100,000 for a stranger (Gordon, Patel, Sohn, Hippen, and 
Sherman, 2014). Their most important finding, though, was that 70% of those 
surveyed did not change their willingness to donate based on subsequent financial 
compensation, and 74% found it unacceptable to pay for organs (Gordon, Patel, 
Sohn, Hippen, and Sherma, 2014). This study’s results seem to demonstrate that 
Americans are not ready to make the shift into a market-based system of organ 
donation.  
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Another concern about purchasing or providing financial inducements for 
organs stems from the fact that many Americans fear that those of lower 
socioeconomic classes will be exploited, as is already the case in developing 
countries like India and Brazil.  Nancy Scheper-Hughes, a Berkley anthropologist, 
observed the hardship and direct effects of organ purchasing on the impoverished 
in Brazil, leading her to argue that organ sales would permit “one relatively 
privileged population [to] claim property rights over the bodies of the 
disadvantaged” (Friedman & Friedman, 2006, para. 5). The possible social 
implications of this proposition have led many groups, including the American 
Society of Transplant Surgeons (ASTS), to voice negative opinion on the sale of 
organs. The ASTS in particular have stated their opposition to solicitation of 
organs from living and deceased donors: one of the problems that they point out is 
the way in which “solicitation is to redirect the donation to a specific individual 
rather than according to the fair policies of allocation (United Network for Organ 
Sharing policy on organ allocation)” (Friedman & Friedman, 2006, para. 6). 
There is concern that organs will not go to people on the top of the donor list, but 
to those with the best financial situation – a method of operation no different from 
the black market system.   
The logical question that many pro-organ market advocates are asking is, 
what is the plan to bridge the gap between the donations on one hand, and the 
need for organs on the other?  While some Asian countries have attempted to 
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bridge this gap through organs donated from living donors (Kim, 2004), many 
European counties and Singapore have implemented effective programs that 
utilize the organs of the recently deceased. The United States has also tried to 
increase its number of deceased-donor organ donations in the hopes of 
eliminating the constant need for live donors.  This recent drive has been 
publicized through celebrity endorsements, public relations efforts, National 
Kidney Foundation efforts, and most effectively, advance permissions as secured 
and communicated through state driver’s licenses. As a result of these efforts, the 
number of deceased-donor organ transplants has increased 32.5% from 1988 to 
2004, and though this number does not nearly cover the increase in needed 
donations, it does show the effectiveness of these campaigns (Friedman & 
Friedman, 2006).  
Singapore, as one country that has been able to significantly increased 
deceased-donor organ donations without either selling organs or promoting donor 
awareness, offers another potential method completely contrary to that in the 
United States.  The Human Organ Transplant Act of 1987, which was amended in 
2004, rules that when a Singaporean citizen dies, doctors can take any organs that 
they feel would be beneficial to another patient.  The patient has the option to opt 
out of these donations, but instead of implying that the patient does not want his 
or her organs donated if not specified, the Singaporean system assumes that the 
organs are up for donation (Bagheri, 2005).  This approach may be particularly 
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effective in America because 95% of Americans either “support or strongly 
support” organ donation, despite the fact that only 40% of eligible donors are 
registered (Siegel, 2014).  If the number of registered donors in the US increased 
to 95%, the number of potential deceased-donor organ dominations would more 
than double. If a trend like that were to occur, America would follow the 
European trend of deceased-donor organ donations becoming on par with their 
living organ donations.   
Those who support organ donations, though, may argue that doubling the 
number of registered donors without paying them is impossible. Here once again 
Singapore can be used as a plausible solution.  The Human Organ Transplant Act 
of 1987 has a built-in incentive for organ donors: if a past donor needs an organ 
transplant in the future, they are prioritized above those on the waiting list who 
have not donated (Bagheri, 2005).  There are many options besides monetary 
payment that can incentivize the sympathetic population to register as organ 
donors. Though the current altruistic system is not functioning well, this lack does 
not mean that the system cannot function with a few alterations, since those who 
are opposed to the selling of organs for transplantation simply want an effective 
transplant system that does not compromise the procurement process, ethically or 
morally.   
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In recent years, the idea of purchasing organs for transplants has been 
gaining traction. The current US system has more than 120,000 names on the 
transplant list, and on average 18 of those people die per day while awaiting an 
organ (Siegel, 2014). Not only is this current system ineffective, but it is also 
biased towards the rich. The most wealthy and unethical of those on the waiting 
list in the US will often fly to India and return home with a new organ, illegally 
purchased through an organ-harvesting ring overseas (Friedman & Friedman, 
2006).  The current American system also fails to compensate donors, who are 
going through extensive surgery out of the goodness of their hearts. Though the 
mortality rate of transplanting an organ is extremely low, somewhere around 
0.03%, the morbidity rate is about 20%, and complications can range from pain, 
infection at the incision site, incisional hernia, pneumonia, blood clots, 
hemorrhaging, potential need for blood transfusions, and side effects associated 
with allergic reactions to the anesthesia (“Being a Living Donor”). Potential long-
term side effects are even more extensive. For lung donations, possible side 
effects include intra-operative ventricular fibrillation arrest, post-operative 
pulmonary artery thrombosis, bronchopleural fistula, pleural effusion, empyema, 
bronchial stricture, pericarditis, arrhythmias, chylothorax, pneumothorax, 
hemoptysis, and dyspnea (“Being a Living Donor”).  For kidney donations there 
is the risk of hypertension, kidney failure, and proteinuria; for liver donations, 
there is the possibility of bile leakage, hyperbilirubinemia, small bowel 
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obstruction, biliary stricture, portal vein thrombosis, pulmonary embolish, intra-
abdominal bleeding, pancreatitis, bleeding duodenal ulcer, renal failure, gastric 
perforation, gastric outlet obstruction, and pleural effusion. Moreover, these long-
term side effects have not been studied extensively, and could pose even more 
unknown risks in the future (Kim, 2004).  These statistics complement the idea of 
a market-based organ system: the donor should be paid or remunerated for the 
fairly high risk of complications associated with donation, as a form of 
compensation for his/ her pain and suffering. 
Though compensation for donors’ pain and risk is a good reason for 
financial incentives in the organ transplant community, another common thought 
process is that the market system will increase the number of donors.  Though 
thousands of financially-compensated black market organ transplants occur every 
year, the only country that legally allows the purchasing of organs is Iran.  In 
1988, a compensated and regulated living-unrelated donor renal transplant 
program was adopted by Iran; by 1999, the donor list for kidneys was nonexistent 
and by 2005 over 19,609 renal transplants were performed under the new system.  
This new system effectively eliminated the need for dialysis in Iran, and since the 
waiting list is nonexistent, that means that even the poorest of those who needed a 
kidney received it.  The Iranian system used compensation effectively to increase 
its number of live donors.  By contrast, as Iran was provided with more donors 
than they had patients who needed transplants, the US was broadening its 
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definition of a healthy organ (Ghods & Savaj, 2006). Friedman and Friedman 
(2006) have found that a common fault in the altruistic system is that because of 
the “shortage of donor kidneys, acceptance of what previously have been termed 
'marginal' kidneys termed 'expanded criteria donors' from geriatric, hypertensive, 
and even proteinuric donors has increased progressively” (para. 3). Unlike the US, 
Iran was able to supply all of those who qualified for their kidney wait lists with 
healthy, live donated organs at a set price point.   
The ethical concerns about an organ market can be justified by those who 
support a compensation-for-donation plan; Iran, for instance, found that many 
nonprofit organizations stepped up to help pay for the organs of those who could 
not afford them. One common opposition, the claim that such systems are 
unethical because they most likely take advantage of the society’s less educated 
members, was also laid to rest, as researchers found that in Iran after “All of these 
donors and recipients were grouped according to their level of education; (they) 
showed no significant differences. In this study, 6.0% of living-unrelated donors 
were illiterate, 24.4% had elementary school education, 63.3% had a high school 
education, and 6.3% had university training” (Ghods & Savaj, 2006, para. 6).  
Though some of the population who donated was not very well educated, this 
number also corresponded to the education levels of those who received the 
organs, which seems to show that those with low education levels benefited from 
organ donation as much as they donated.  
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It is not possible to ignore that Iran differs vastly from the United States in 
both economic and social terms, but those who support compensation for organ 
donation have presented economic models applicable to the United States.  One of 
these models was created by the 1992 Nobel Laureate in Economics, Gary S. 
Becker and his co-worker Julio J Elias; this model listed a fair market price of 
$45,000 for live-donor kidneys. They came to their findings by “Assuming that an 
American earning a mean of $40 000 annually has a life valued at $3 million, 
faces a risk of death from nephrectomy of 1%, a decrease of 5% in quality of life, 
and will lose $7000 of income due to convalescence from surgery” (as cited in 
Friedman & Friedman, 2006, para. 11), though the death rate they calculated is 
also significantly higher found by most studies, which is closer to three in 10,000 
(Friedman & Friedman, 2006).  
While waiting for a kidney transplant, patients typically go on dialysis to 
try and replicate the blood purifying qualities of the kidneys. Dialysis is not only a 
painful and temporary fix, but also an expensive one. According to the American 
Association of Kidney Patients, it costs about $30,000 dollars per patient per year 
to perform dialysis, and the average wait period in America for a kidney is three 
to five years for those who do not have a friend or relative willing and able to 
donate (“The Waiting List”). This means that the total payment for dialysis for 
someone in need of a kidney who does not have a direct donor match in the 
family would be on average $90,000 to $150,000.  For insurance companies, then, 
10
The Downtown Review, Vol. 3 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/tdr/vol3/iss2/4
a compensatory organ market makes especial sense, since the cost of dialysis – 
which is usually covered in full by the insurance company – is more expensive 
than the predicted fair market price for a kidney.  Those who support a market for 
organs believe that it is an economically beneficial system, and that it is morally 
superior to the altruistic system.  Quite simply, the current system allows for 
Americans to die every day while waiting for organs that could be procured 
through other motivations.   
My personal opinion on whether the purchasing of organs should be 
allowed is a combination of ideas from altruistic systems and the free organ 
market system. The first step in an ideal system would be to follow Singapore’s 
lead and change our deceased-donor organ system to an opt-out, rather than opt-
in, route: this is because 55% of Americans are not registered as organ donors 
even though they support organ donation (Siegel, 2014). I doubt that the people 
represented by this percentage are waiting for more incentives; more likely, they 
are poorly informed or too lazy to go register. After a ten-year trial, I would re-
evaluate how effectively the new system has worked following its 
implementation, and if it remained ineffective at reducing the need for 
uncompensated organ donations, I would then switch to a system in which 
surviving family members were compensated for the deceased’s organs after 
death.  If surviving family members were compensated around $10,000 for a 
kidney, for example, that would represent about a fourth of Becker and Elias’s 
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aforementioned market price: this decrease is due mostly to the fact that the 
quality of life after the surgery and the risk associated with the surgery is not 
applicable to a deceased donor.  Furthermore, this monetary incentive could be 
enough to motivate the 55% of Americans who already believe in organ donation 
to register. However, I would avoid selling or compensating for organs from 
living donors, as this would leave the United States open to a potentially 
dangerous socioeconomic clash.  Though results in Iran were promising, a free 
market organ system in the United States has greater potential to prey on poor and 
homeless populations, and less social leeway for such exploitation. In Iran, the 
potential for exploitation of the poor through incentivized organ harvesting was 
not a major problem within the country itself, considering their track record of 
human rights violations (“Iran”); the United States, however, also cannot take the 
risk that charitable organizations will not step up to help pay for the organs of the 
poor or uninsured.   
Ultimately, I do think that American society could understand and accept 
the compensation for organs post-mortem, especially because deceased donors are 
not being harmed by the surgeries or exposing themselves to unnecessary risk for 
monetary gain. The system could work for the insurance companies, at least for 
kidney donations, if the price of the organ is less than stopgap measures such as 
dialysis.  The insurance companies could use this saving to cover the costs of any 
transplant surgeries that are not cost beneficial.  The healthcare system already 
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benefits the rich in many ways, so if the organ donation market has to benefit the 
rich slightly to help a greater amount of people, this seems like an acceptable 
tradeoff. For example, the current dialysis system is not of equal quality for all 
patients with kidney failure.  Many patients who are on dialysis for significant 
amounts of time have major disruption to their days because of their daily 
scheduled transfusions.  Many dialysis patients also feel that it is easier for them 
to puncture themselves with the needle, much like diabetics do not go to get 
insulin shots delivered by professionals.  One popular option for upper-class 
Americans with this disease is a home dialysis system.  To set up a home dialysis 
center, however, you not only need to own a home, but you also need to be able 
install certain waste pipes and electrical circuits that cost thousands of dollars out 
of pocket. The fact that you have to own a house and be able make these drastic 
changes to it eliminates a large percent of the working class because they can only 
afford to rent cheap housing (“Cost Associated With Home Dialysis”).  If the 
number of organs available for transplant can match the number of needed 
recipients through the buying of organs donated post mortem, then there will be 
less of a problem among different classes with the same needs. Like Iran, if the 
United States can eliminate the donor list, then everyone has been given an equal 
chance at life without falling into what Pope John Paul II warned against when he 
said that “buying and selling organs violates the dignity of the human person” 
(Friedman, 2006, para. 6).   
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The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 and the American altruistic 
donation system of today both need to be revised in order for patients to be able to 
receive the organs they need.  Although there are effective arguments from those 
who both support and oppose organ markets, the effective solution may be 
somewhere in between, and should start by addressing the complacent attitude 
that a majority of the American population takes toward organ donation.  This 
motivation could come from financial compensation, or from making the 
registration process easier or opt-out versus opt-in, but the important thing is that 
action is taken immediately because the dearth of transplantable organs is 
becoming a literally life-or-death situation.   
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